contingency manipulations have a different effect on causal judgments than on predictive and preparatory judgments. For example, Vadillo, Miller, and Matute, (2005; see also Vadillo & Matute, 2007) showed that contingency information had no impact on participants' likelihood to predict the outcome in the presence of the cue. At the same time, however, participants in those studies showed an accurate use of contingency information to estimate both the causal and the predictive value of the cue. Thus, apparently, people use contingency to infer causal and predictive value, even though they do not use it to predict the likelihood that the outcome will follow.
In a related study, De Houwer, Vandorpe, and Beckers (2007) showed that contingency information was used to make accurate estimates of causal relations, while it had little impact on participants' stating that they would prepare for the outcome when the cue was present. Consistent with the findings of Vadillo et al. (2005) regarding outcome predictions, p(O|C) seemed to be the main determinant of preparatory judgments as well.
At least at first glance, those results seem quite contrary to the idea that opened this article, namely that contingency knowledge is needed to predict the occurrence of important events, and to prepare for them. From a normative point of view, it certainly does make sense to neglect the value of contingency when making predictions. After all, the value of p(O|C) is the only thing one needs to know when predicting whether the outcome will follow the cue.
Information on p(O|¬C) becomes absolutely irrelevant in this case. But the potential dissociation between contingency and preparatory behavior is not that obvious. On the one hand, preparatory judgments, like predictions, could simply rely on p(O|C). People could prepare for the outcome whenever they know it will Production Number: R562B Contingency, prediction, and preparation 4 occur. On the other hand, however, it is not that clear that the most adaptive behavior that one can adopt when preparing for an outcome should rely simply on p(O|C). If the outcome is occurring with the same probability whether the target cue is present or absent, this becomes a situation in which the outcome follows the cue regularly, but without any predictive relation between them. The cue is not a signal for the outcome, but a completely unrelated event. In this situation organisms should either look for another cue with greater predictive value to help them decide when to act, or else they will have to be preparing at all times for any of the many possible outcomes that could follow any of the millions of cues that are present at any given time. There are so many potential outcomes for which there are no known causes (or good signals) that it becomes impossible to prepare for them all. Thus, when preparing for outcomes it might be much more efficient to rely on the predictive value of the cue, which depends on contingency, rather than on p(O|C). Indeed, if any conclusion can be drawn from decades of related research on Pavlovian conditioning it is that nonhuman animals do use contingency to prepare for outcomes (Rescorla, 1968) . As of human preparatory Pavlovian responses, we know of no study that has tested whether they rely on cue-outcome contingency rather than on p(O|C).
In sum, further evidence is needed before we can reject (or accept) the general assumption that people use contingency information to prepare for outcomes. Although several studies show a dissociation between causal judgments and predictions (e.g., Gredebäck, Winman, & Juslin, 2000; Matute, Vegas & De Marez, 2002; Vadillo et al., 2005; Vadillo & Matute, 2007) , the evidence on the dissociation between contingency and preparatory judgments Production Number: R562B Contingency, prediction, and preparation 5 relies on only one study (De Houwer et al., 2007) . Moreover, none of the above mentioned studies has explored the effects of contingency information on both outcome predictions and preparatory judgments. If our hypothesis was correct, then preparatory judgments, though not predictions, might show sensitivity to contingency.
Experiment 1

Method
Participants
Fifty-one college students voluntarily took part in the study. Random assignment of participants to each of two groups resulted in 24 in Group High, and 27 in Group Low.
Procedure and Design
Participants were told to imagine that they were physicians who were trying to find out whether a relationship existed between a cue (a fictitious medicine, Dugetil) and an outcome (a side effect, skin rash, in a fictitious patient). P(O|C), was 1 in both groups but p(O|¬C), was 0.5 in Group High and 1 in Group Low. Therefore, ∆P was 0.5 in Group High and 0 in Group Low. This should permit us to compare the sensitivity of causal, prediction, and preparation judgments to specific manipulations of covariational information.
Judgments which are only sensitive to p(O|C) should not differ between these two groups, but judgments which are sensitive to ∆P should.
Participants received 120 medical cards, one per trial. In cue-present trials the computer screen showed the phrase "Mr. X has taken Dugetil" and a picture of pill bottle. In cue-absent trails the phrase "Mr. X has not taken Dugetil" Production Number: R562B Contingency, prediction, and preparation 6 and a picture of a bottle crossed in red, was shown. To encourage their attention, participants had to answer the question "Do you think that Mr. X is going to develop a skin rash?" by clicking the "yes" or "no" button in every trial.
Then, a feedback panel showed the phrase "Mr. X has developed the skin rash" and a picture of an ill face (outcome present trials), or the phrase "Mr. X has not developed the skin rash" and a picture of a healthy face (outcome absent trials). 
Results
Figure 1 depicts the mean judgments at test. As expected, a 3 (Question)
x 2 (Contingency) ANOVA showed significant main effects of Question, F(2, 98) = 27.10, p < .001, and Contingency, F(1, 49) =17.07, p < .001, as well as an interaction, F(2, 98) = 6.14, p < .01. Both causal and preparatory judgments were significantly higher in Group High than in Group Low, t(49) = 6.46, p < .001 and t(49) = 2.41, p < .05, respectively. This indicates that both these judgments were affected by contingency. Prediction judgments did not significantly differ as a function of contingency, t(49) = 1.28, p = .21.
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Experiment 2
As expected, Experiment 1 showed that both causal and preparatory judgments, but not predictions, were affected by contingency information. The results of the causal and prediction judgments are consistent with several previous human studies (e.g., Gredebäck et al., 2000; Matute et al., 2002; Vadillo et al., 2005; Vadillo & Matute, 2007) . However, the results on preparatory judgments, although expected, contradicted the null result reported by De Houwer et al. (2007) . Our Experiment 2 therefore had several goals. The first one was to provide a replication for the results of Experiment 1 using a very different procedure, in which most parameters changed, allowing the generality of the effect to be assessed. The most important change in this experiment was probably the one in our dependent variable. A functional analysis of contingency learning cannot rely solely on what people say that they would do (i.e., their subjective, verbalized judgments), or what they say that somebody else should do. Our analysis needs convergent evidence from the actual, nonverbal, preparatory behavior. Experiment 2 was aimed at extending the findings of Experiment 1 to a more comprehensive framework that includes not only verbal (numerical) judgments but, most importantly, the nonverbal preparatory behavior itself. On a lesser point, we also aimed at using less extreme contingencies. Although extreme values were needed for fair comparison with previous research (i.e., both De Houwer et al., and Vadillo et al. used a contingency of zero and a p(O|C) of 1), and although the difference between the contingency and p(O|C) needs to be large for the dissociation to be observed, we thought it important to use now a lower p(O|C) so as to make sure that the results are not restricted to the special condition in which the outcome is always Production Number: R562B Contingency, prediction, and preparation 8 present. Also, in order to make sure that the dissociation observed in the judgmental responses in Experiment 1 was not due to our presenting all questions in the same screen, we now manipulated the question type between participants, with each participant answering only one question. Finally, we used predictive-value rather than causal-value questions. If our hypothesis is correct the dissociation that we observed between prediction and causal-value judgments should also be observed between prediction and predictive-value judgments (see, e.g., Vadillo et al., 2005) .
Method
Participants
Thirty-four anonymous volunteers took part in the study. Random assignment resulted in 16 participants in the High contingency condition, and 18 in the Low contingency condition. Orthogonally, 16 participants emitted a prediction judgment at the end of training and 18 emitted a prediction-value judgment.
Procedure and Design
This experiment used the Martians videogame originally developed by Arcediano, Ortega, and Matute (1996) ; however, it used the new and improved version developed by Franssen, Clarysse, Beckers, van Vooren, and Baeyens Contingency, prediction, and preparation 9 laser-gun by pressing the spacebar, and to destroy as many spaceships as possible. This results in a stable bar-pressing rate. From time to time, the Martians activate an anti-laser shield, consisting of screen flashes and a distinctive sound during 500 ms. This shield is the outcome to be prepared for.
If the participant continues pressing the bar when the shield is active, the lasergun becomes deactivated for 5 seconds and dozens of spaceships invade the screen faster than usual (one spaceship every 50 ms). These invasions cannot be escaped once started. Thus, to avoid them, participants have to suppress their bar-pressing behavior immediately before the shield is connected.
Participants are also told that there will be some cues that may (or may not) be sometimes followed by the activation or the shield. If participants learn that a cue is a good predictor of the shield, then they should respond to this cue by suppressing their bar-pressing behavior in anticipation of the outcome.
Suppression ratios are conventionally assessed as A/(A+B), where A is the number of bar-presses during the cue, and B the number of bar-presses in a period of time identical to the duration of the cue and immediately preceding it.
In this experiment, the training phase consisted of 69 trials in pseudorandom order. In both groups the Target cue was presented in 30 trials, and the activation of the shield followed 80% of them (24 trials). Contingency was manipulated by varying the percentage of trials where the context, rather than the cue, was followed by the outcome. In the High Contingency condition, the context was never followed by the activation of the shield, while in the Low Contingency condition the context was followed by the shield 80% of the time (i.e., 24 trials), therefore making the Target cue noncontingent upon the shields despite its high probability of being reinforced. An additional 15 trials were used Production Number: R562B Contingency, prediction, and preparation 10 in both groups with a Filler cue which was never followed by the shield and its only purpose was to prevent indiscriminate suppression (Arcediano et al., 1996) . The Target and Filler cues were two "Martian letters", counterbalanced, that represented the interception of messages between spaceships (Costa, 2009 ). They appeared from time to time during 1.5 seconds. At test the Target cue was presented for 3 s so that suppression ratio could be assessed (see Arcediano et al.) . Intertrial intervals lasted between 7 and 13.50 seconds.
Upon completion of the Martians task, the judgmental variables were assessed between participants. The screen presented the Target 
Results
Behavioral data
The results of the experiment were as expected. Participants in the High contingency condition suppressed more their bar-pressing behavior in response and with previous literature, predictive-value judgments were significantly affected by the contingency manipulation, F(1, 16) = 10.51, p < .01, whereas prediction judgments were not, F(1, 14) = 3.97, p = . 54.
Discussion
As noted in the Introduction, it is often assumed that the reason why humans and animals extract contingency information from the environment is a very practical one: Being able to identify those cues that signal important events, so as to be able to predict their occurrence and prepare for them.
Previous research had indeed shown that animals use contingency information to prepare for outcomes (Rescorla, 1968) . It had also shown that people use contingency information to acquire knowledge not only about causation, but also about the predictive (signal) value of the cues in the environment (Vadillo et al., 20005; Vadillo & Matute, 2007) . However, it had also shown that people do not use this knowledge to predict the outcomes (e.g., Gredebäck et al., 2000; Matute et al., 2002; Vadillo et al., 2005; Vadillo & Matute, 2007) or to prepare for them (De Houwer et al., 2007) . This seemed inconsistent with the general assumption that the function of contingency learning is to predict and prepare for outcomes.
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Our experiments show that preparatory judgment and behavior are sensitive to contingency. The two experiments used very different procedures and dependent variables and showed consistently that preparatory judgment and behavior were significantly stronger when there was a high level of contingency. Participants also used contingency to detect which cues had the higher causal and predictive value. Consistent with previous reports, however, outcome predictions were not based on contingency (see e.g., Gredebäck et al., 2000; Matute et al., 2002; Vadillo et al., 2005; Vadillo & Matute, 2007) . Similar dissociations have been found for judgments about the frequency with which the outcome follows the cue (Matute, Arcediano, & Miller, 1996) , and for outcome recall in the presence of the cue (Mitchell, Lovibond, & Gan, 2005) .
Both of them also appear to be independent of contingency and different from causal judgments. Moreover, related research is also showing that people tend to use base rates, rather than contingencies, to infer correlations and to make predictions (Fiedler, Freytag, & Meiser, 2009 ).
We cannot know the reason why De Houwer et al. (2007) observed a null result in the sensitivity of preparatory judgments to contingency, but the main differences between our judgmental study (Experiment 1) and theirs are that we manipulated contingency between, rather than within-participants, we used 120 training trials rather than 10, and we assessed preparatory responses differently. These, and perhaps several other differences we are not aware of, increased the chances that sensitivity of preparatory judgments to contingency could be detected in our studies.
Why, then, is contingency learning used to prepare for outcomes if it is not used when predicting their occurrence? If the outcome is occurring often Production Number: R562B Contingency, prediction, and preparation 13 regardless of whether the cue is present or absent, a normatively adjusted response should be sensitive to several facts (a) the contingency between the cue and the outcome is zero, (b) the causal value of the cue is zero, (c) the predictive value of the cue is zero, (d) the probability that the outcome will occur in the next trial is high, (e) the likelihood (the prediction) that the outcome will occur following the cue is high. However, which would be the most effective preparatory behavior? A preparatory response speaks to the question of what should be the best possible use of knowledge and information in order to best adapt to the demands of the environment. This includes making good use of knowledge and information, but also of energy resources, and of cost-efficient behavior. Therefore this also includes assessing the high cost of emitting a preparatory response in all trials, irrespective of the predictive value of the cue.
What the present experiments show is that once participants know that the outcome will occur with a given probability and that there are no clues as to what its cause can be, then they learn that it makes no sense to keep preparing for that outcome whenever any of the many irrelevant cues in the environment is present (or at least it makes no sense to prepare as intensely as if it were contingent). Although we are often able to predict the occurrence of important events just by looking at their base rates, it would be just impossible to prepare for all types of outcomes that may occur, irrespective of their degree of contingency with the signals that are present.
Predictions, preparatory behavior and prediction-value judgments are so often taken as synonyms that we all tend to assume that animals use contingency to predict the outcomes. However, the only thing we can know for sure when we work with animals is that they use contingency to prepare for Production Number: R562B Contingency, prediction, and preparation 14 outcomes. Whether they use contingency because they predict the outcome or because they know that the cue has a high predictive value is something that, to our knowledge, has not been addressed in the animal literature. Our results suggest that, in addition to preparation behavior, it is the predictive-value of cues, rather than the predictions of the outcome, what requires contingency. This point should be valid for human and nonhuman animals.
In sum, the present experiments show that contingency learning may have survival value after all. It is true that we do not need it to know the likelihood that an outcome will occur, but we do need it if we want to be able to select those signals with the higher predictive (or causal) value in our environment so that we can engage in efficient preparatory behavior. Most importantly, and regardless of the merits of the particular account we have presented herein, our research calls for the need to add preparatory judgments and behavior to the research agenda of contingency learning. As noted in the Introduction, the little attention that preparatory judgments and behavior have captured in the human learning research tradition is surprising, and it will be a task for future research to investigate under which conditions contingency learning is or is not useful to prepare for outcomes.
